Accounting regulation is a highly topical issue for listed companies in Europe.
then proceeds to examine their incidence in the financial statements of the IBEX-35 companies over a three year period.
Introduction
The International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) came into being in At the time of writing six IFRSs have been issued, but the IASB is in the process of addressing some highly complex technical accounting issues that will, in due course, result in the issue of more standards. . It can be expected that national standard setting bodies around the world will gradually become less important, and may in due course cease to exist. The most significant national standard setter of all is, of course, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) and, until recently, it appeared that US standard setting might proceed autonomously without much regard to the activities of the IASB. However, a convergence project between the in the USA and IASB was launched in the autumn of 2003, and some significant movement towards convergence has already taken place.
One of the most significant developments of recent times has been that the IASC/B has moved away from the objective of 'harmonisation' of regulations, and towards an ultimate goal of global standardisation. If such standardisation is to be achieved it is likely to be through a combination of means. As noted above, the EU will adopt international accounting standards from listed companies from 2005 onwards. Some countries within the EU will permit or require adoption by all companies (included non listed). Even where they are not formally adopted for all companies within a member state, they are likely to have a pervasive effect by influencing national regulators. The process of convergence with US standards will take longer and is much more uncertain in its effects. It may not ultimately pervade all aspects of regulation. Nevertheless it is not overstating the case to suppose that the ultimate goal is one of standardising accounting regulation across the world. 'Harmonisation' constituted a broad church, permissive of a substantial level of national difference in regulation. A global approach to standard setting, however, requires a much greater level of agreement between national representatives, and will require much greater rigo ur to ensure compliance.
Accounting in Spain -some background
Up till the present day, substantial differences have continued to exist between the accounting regulatory regimes of different countries, despite the move towards international harmonisation (Street et al. 2000) . Differences tend to persist in areas such as asset valuation, revenue and expense recognition and measurement, depreciation and amortisation, recognition of provisions and liabilities, accounting for stock options, foreign currency, derivatives and discounting. The reconciliation to US GAAP of those Spanish companies that are listed in both Madrid and New York is illustrative of the degree of difference. Table 1 shows 2001 data for all seven companies in this category. In all cases, earnings under US GAAP are lower than under Spanish accounting regulation.
[ Table 1 about here] Within Spanish GAAP, as elsewhere, there is a great deal of scope for variation within reported results (Lainez et al., 1999) . For example, in valuing inventories Spanish accounting regulation currently permits the adoption of average cost, FIFO or LIFO. The differences in reporting profits can be substantial depending upon which policy is selected by management. • Charging expenses to reserves (BBVA and BSCH)
• Overstatement of net income (Sol Meliá and Campofrio)
• Classification of extraordinary profits as income arising from ordinary activities (Unión Fenosa)
• Failure to provide full information resulting in a limitation of audit scope (Pescanova, EADS, Avanzit, Funespaña and Urbas).
Regulatory agencies responsible for policing the implementation of accounting regulation are often accused in Spain of deliberately ignoring obvious cases of rule infringement (for example, see Pérez, 2002) .
The research study
The objective of this study is to examine some of the distinctive features of Spanish financial reporting. Specifically, we identify the extent of certain earnings manipulation practices in large listed Spanish companies. It should be noted that the type of earnings manipulation identified in this article is relatively overt, and almost certainly legal under current Spanish regulation. Outside the scope of the study, therefore, are all those categories of manipulative behaviour in relation to earnings that are hidden and cannot readily be discerned by an informed and skilled observer.
The following occurrences have been classified for the purposes of this study as possible indicators of earnings management:
• Auditor report qualifications (in Spain there is no requirement to restate the financial statements to reflect the effect of the qualifications. The effect is, however, noted in the audit report).
• Special authorisations from regulatory agencies to adopt non-standard policy • Changes in accounting policy from one year to another (in Spain, such changes have to be explained and the consequences quantified in the auditor's report).
• Existence of extraordinary results and prior period adjustments in the income statement
The sample of companies comprises the 35 companies included in the Madrid Stock Exchange's IBEX-35 index. These are the largest companies in Spain and are likely to account for a significant proportion of the total movement of funds in and out of the Spanish capital market. The annual reports of the 35 companies were thoroughly scrutinised over a three year period from 1999 to 2001 in order to identify instances of the four possible indicators of earnings management. The incidence and impact of special authorisations, audit report qualifications and extraordinary items are easy to identify in an annual report. Analysis of any changes in accounting policy are also easy to identify (from information included in the audit report) but require careful consideration as to whether or not they are likely to constitute earnings management behaviour. Audit report information was considered in conjunction with detailed analysis of the notes to the financial statements in determining whether or not the changes in policy could be categorised as earnings management behaviour.
Accounting policies were compared both with those policies adopted in previous years, and with those adopted by competitors in order to assess whether or not an individual company's policies were out of line with those generally adopted in the rest of the sector.
Results
The analysis of the results is presented in two sections. The analysis separates the effects of, on the one hand, audit report qualifications, special authorisations and changes in accounting policy, and, on the other hand, extraordinary items. This is because the first three categories point much more clearly towards manipulation of earnings behaviour. The existence of extraordinary items, however, is more ambiguous; they may indicate an attempt at classificatory smoothing, but may be quite genuinely extraordinary (within the definition offered by Spanish accounting regulation). It is beyond the scope of this paper to examine the nature of the extraordinary items but their effect on net earnings is reported here as being worthy of note for two principal reasons:
• The sheer incidence of extraordinary items in the financial statements reviewed.
• The preponderance of extraordinary expenses compared to extraordinary income. Table 2 contained at least one instance of these effects, and in two cases (BBVA and BSCH -both banks -there were two instances). The lower part of the table demonstrates the level and effect of extraordinary income and expenses on the reporting earnings.
[ Table 2 about here] Table 2 shows the aggregate effect on reported earnings across the IBEX-35.
Two companies experienced auditor qualifications, three had special authorisations and five had changes in accounting policy suggestive of earnings management. Adjusted earnings for the nine companies are some 22% lower than reported earnings once the effects of these adjustments are taken into account. The effect of extraordinary items is striking; at the individual company level extraordinary expenses are far higher than extraordinary income.
[ Table 2 about here] Finally, the impact of earnings management on reported earnings was assessed for each of the three financial years in the 1999-2001 period. The aggregate impact on earnings of three categories (audit report qualifications, special authorisations and changes in accounting policy) was assessed and an adjusted net earnings figure was calculated. (Note that, for this purpose, and for the reasons explained earlier, extraordinary items were excluded from the analysis).
The difference between reported and adjusted net earnings is expressed as a percentage for each of the companies concerned in Table 3. [ Table 3 about here]
It may be noted that in 1999, a year when the economy was in a relatively buoyant condition, the reported earnings of 9 firms were less than adjusted (Breton and Taffler, 1995) .
Furthermore, Dechow and Skinner (2000) argue that even if financial statements provide sufficient information to permit users to adjust for earnings management, there would still be cause for concern over the value of the information content because of 'the possibility that certain investors rely completely on earnings numbers reported on the face of the income statement because their ability to process more sophisticated (i.e. footnote) information is limited'.
The results of the research show that some element of overt earnings management practice is common in large Spanish companies. The unusually high incidence of audit report qualifications identified by Acerete Gil et al. (2002) and the CNMV suggests that corporate management commonly takes the decision to overstate or understate net earnings even at the expense of a report qualification. In some cases, this may be because managers genuinely feel that their own presentation provides a fairer view. However, it appears in practice that many audit report qualifications relate simply to disagreement over the adequacy of discretionary accruals elements.
The results of the study over a three year time period suggest that the direction of earnings management could be related to general economic conditions. (This possibility was flagged by Merchant (1990) ). It appears that Spanish corporate managers are accustomed to (often) largescale accounting manipulation, and the change of regulatory regime may not necessarily alter behaviour. As demonstrated in this study regulatory agencies were quite prepared to offer dispensations from compliance to effective lobbyists in 2001; it may be reasonable to suppose that lobbying in the Spanish environment will continue to produce successful outcomes for the lobbyists.
Limitations and suggestions for further work
The study reported in this paper has some clear limitations. The analysis has been limited only to those earnings management practices that can be easily identified from published financial statements. From an agency theoretical perspective, it might be expected that managers would attempt, as far as possible, to conceal such practices. Agency theoretical considerations suggest that we might expect, with a reasonable degree of confidence, that deliberately concealed earnings management behaviour also takes place.
A further limitation should be recognised in respect of the sample of companies selected for examination. While the IBEX-35 companies are certainly significant to the Spanish economy, they may not be representative of it. On the one hand, they are more profoundly affected by developments and improvements in corporate governance, but on the other hand, they are under greater pressure from analysts to report within certain parameters.
The study suggests opportunities for further research: 1. It would be possible to extend the analysis further to cover both a longer time period and a larger number of companies. Further research of the type pioneered in the USA by, for example, McNichols and Wilson (2988) , applying discretionary accruals models to large financial data sets in order to identify the extent of covert earnings management, could be undertaken in Spain.
2. It is clear from the evidence presented in this paper that extraordinary items are frequently encountered features of Spanish financial reporting. This paper has not attempted detailed analysis of these items, and it could be a fruitful area for further research. 
